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      Controlled-flight-into-terrain incidents have been a leading cause of aircraft related fatalities 
for a number of years.  The development of warning systems to prevent this type of mishap has 
been constant since the early 1970’s.  A family Ground Proximity Warning Systems and, 
recently, Terrain Awareness and Warning Systems have been mandated for use in commercial 
aircraft in the United States. 
     Such systems have also been adapted for use in high performance military aircraft, although 
they tend to be very different from the commercially required variants due to their unique 
operating environment and aircraft performance requirements. 
     In this paper, one such system is described in detail, and a set of unique test techniques 
required to test systems for high performance aircraft is explored.  A number of recommendations 
for testing terrain warning systems intended for use in high performance aircraft are also 
developed.
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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ACI  Amplifier, Control Intercommunication 
 
ADC  Air Data Computer 
 
AGL  Above Ground Level 
 
AOB  Angle of Bank 
 
ARDS  Advanced Range Data System 
 
ATAMS Aircraft Target Area Maneuvering Simulation 
  
CFIT  Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
 
DTED  Digital Terrain Elevation Database 
 
DMC  Digital Map Computer 
 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration (United States) 
 
FLTA  Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance 
 
FMS  Flight Management System 
 
GPS  Global Positioning System 
 
GPWS  Ground Proximity Warning System 
 
HAT  Height Above Terrain 
 
HERR  GPS Reported Horizontal Position Error 
 
HUD  Head Up Display 
 
IFR  Instrument Flight Rules 
 
IMN  Indicated Mach Number 
 
INS  Inertial Navigation System 
 
KCAS  Knots Calibrated Airspeed 
 
LAT  Low-Altitude Tactics 
 
LSO  Landing Signal Officer 
 
MSL  Mean Sea Level 
 x 
 
NTSB  National Transportation Safety Board (United States) 
 
ORD  Operational Requirements Document 
 
ORT  Oblique Recovery Trajectory 
 
PDA  Premature Descent Alert 
 
Pnw  Percentage of Nuisance Warnings 
 
RADALT Radar Altimeter 
 
RCC  Range Control Center (Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake ) 
 
RDTED Re-arced Digital Terrain Elevation Data 
 
RNAV  Area Navigation 
 
ROJ  Reverse Oblique Jink 
 
SOJ  Straight-ahead Oblique Jink 
 
TAMMAC Tactical Aircraft Moving Map Computer 
 
TAWS  Terrain Awareness and Warning System 
 
TCT  Test Coordination Team 
 
TERPS  Terminal Procedures 
 
TM  Telemetry 
 
VERR  GPS Reported Vertical Position Error 
 
VFR  Visual Flight Rules 
 
VMC  Visual Meteorological Conditions 
 
VRT  Vertical Recovery Trajectory 
 
WonW  Weight on Wheels 
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1.  BACKGROUND 
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT GPWS SYSTEMS 
     In the 1970’s a number of studies were conducted to examine what could be done about one of 
the leading causes of fatal aircraft accidents – the so-called Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT).  
A CFIT event is defined as an instance where an airplane, under the flight crew’s control, is 
inadvertently flown into terrain, obstructions or water without either sufficient or timely 
flightcrew awareness to have prevented the event [1].  As a result of these studies, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) mandated in 1974 that large commercial aircraft be equipped 
with a Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) compliant with Technical Standard Order 
TSO-C92c.  In 1978 the FAA extended the GPWS requirement to Part 135 certificate holders 
operating turbojet powered airplanes with 10 or more passenger seats [2].  This ruling did not 
affect turbo-propeller powered (turboprop) aircraft because it was believed that the performance 
characteristics of turboprop airplanes made them less susceptible to CFIT accidents.   
     However, later studies, including accident investigations by the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB), analyzed CFIT accidents involving turboprop airplanes and concluded that some 
mishaps could have been avoided if GPWS equipment had been used.  As a result, the FAA 
amended the ruling in 1992 to require that all turbine powered aircraft with greater than 10 
passenger seats be equipped with GPWS systems [2]. 
     Since the original GPWS requirements were mandated, advances in terrain mapping capability 
permitted the development of a new family of GPWS system that provides greater situational 
awareness for flight crews.  These systems, known as Enhanced GPWS (EGPWS), have evolved 
into a type of system more broadly known as Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS).  
After the crash of an American Airlines 757 equipped with GPWS near Cali, Columbia, the 
NTSB recommended that the FAA study EGPWS systems and require their installation if they 
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were found to be effective.  Subsequent studies by the Department of Transportation into CFIT 
accidents between 1985 and 1995 concluded that EGPWS or TAWS systems could have 
prevented 95-100 percent of them [3].  As a result, in 1998 the FAA mandated that TAWS 
systems be installed in all commercial aircraft (with some limited exceptions) configured with 
more than six passenger seats [2].  
 
MILITARY GPWS SYSTEMS 
      Both tactical and transport class military aircraft have suffered high rates of CFIT accidents as 
well. The 1996 death of commerce Secretary Ron Brown and 34 others in Croatia in an Air Force 
C-9 highlighted the need for such systems in military transport aircraft.  These aircraft, while not 
covered under the FAA GPWS or TAWS mandates, can clearly benefit from the same types of 
systems in use on commercial aircraft.  Indeed, most types of large military transport aircraft 
could use the same systems installed in commercial aircraft, without requiring extensive 
modifications to either hardware or the protection algorithms due to their similar maneuvering 
limitations. 
      As an example applying to tactical military aircraft, CFIT was the probable cause of over 30% 
of all F/A-18 losses during the first ten years of the aircraft’s existence, [4] and is to date the 
leading single cause of the loss of aircraft in that community.  The single -seat layout, frequent 
task saturation experienced by aircrew, and dynamic flight profiles combine to make an 
extremely strong case for inclusion of terrain avoidance systems in such aircraft.  The frequent 
nap-of-the-Earth profiles flown by many rotary wing platforms make them prime candidates for 
such systems as well. 
     However, the operating environment and mission of high-performance tactical aircraft provide 
unique challenges for designers of GPWS systems.  Many tactical aircraft use computer systems 
and displays that are integrated in such a manner as to make it difficult to add external functions 
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to the overall avionics systems without extensive integration efforts.  In addition, the flight 
envelopes of tactical aircraft are sufficiently different from transport class aircraft as to make the 
warning algorithms substantially different. 
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2. GPWS/TAWS SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY 
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM 
     Federally mandated GPWS systems for commercial aircraft initially were required to alert the 
aircrew to potential CFIT situations according to the modes [5] shown in Table 2-1.  This type of 
system uses inputs from aircraft sensors for determining altitude, altitude rate of change and other 
aircraft conditions such as gear or flaps positions, and provides a warning of potential contact 
with the ground, taking into account crew recognition and reaction time.  Aircraft sensor inputs to 
the system can include a radio altimeter, air data computer or barometric altimeter, and deviation 
from ILS glideslope and localizer.  The system outputs include visual and aural alerts and 
warnings when it detects by calculated position rate-of-change that the aircraft is closing with 
terrain.  This type of system, though very useful, provides limited CFIT protection because it is 
unable to account for rapidly changing terrain under the aircraft or obstructions in the flight path.  
In addition, when in landing configuration, (gear and flaps deployed) warnings are inhibited for 








1 Excessive Rates of Descent 
2 Excessive Closure Rate to Terrain 
3 Negative Climb Rate or Altitude Loss After Takeoff 
4 Flight Into Terrain When Not in Landing Configuration 
5 Excessive Downward Deviation From an ILS Glidescope 






     Current regulations require systems compliant with TSO-C151a be installed in most 
commercial aircraft [2].  These systems offer greater protection from CFIT than GPWS because 
of their Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA) capability and Premature Descent Alert 
(PDA) functionality.  TAWS systems also incorporate improved situational awareness displays 
and provide the basic GPWS functionality contained in earlier systems.  These systems are 
broken into two types, Class A and Class B systems, mandated depending on aircraft operating 
criteria as shown in Table 2-2 [6]. 
     TAWS systems utilize terrain, airport and obstacle databases, employing the global standard 
WGS-84 spheroid for latitude/longitude reference to provide flight crews with an improved 
predictive terrain hazard warning function. The predictive function is achieved by feeding the 
aircraft's known position (as determined by a flight management system or by GPS) to a terrain 
database, enabling the computer to predict terrain ahead and to the side of the aircraft's flight 
path. By referencing terrain and airport databases, TAWS can warn of descent below safe vertical 
profiles when the aircraft is in a landing configuration and there is no instrument landing system 
glidescope signal present. 
     Class A systems also incorporate a color display allowing rapid identification of terrain 
hazards together with a graphical display of the surrounding terrain. The aircraft position is 
shown on the display either by GPS alone or through the flight management system.  Specific 
TAWS functionality is described in the following sections. 
Table 2-2 




























A 121 All YES YES 1-6 Either YES YES 
A 135 >9 YES YES 1-6 GPS YES YES 
B 135 6-9 YES YES 1,3,6 GPS NO YES 
B 91 6+ YES YES 1,3,6 GPS NO YES 
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TAWS Minimum Requirements 
Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance 
     The TAWS Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA) warning capability “looks” ahead of 
and to the side of the aircraft’s predicted flight path and issues a warning if terrain or obstacles 
penetrate the search volume, where the defined search volume varies as a function of flight phase 
and aircraft maneuvers.  The flight phase must be determined by the TAWS computer using 
available inputs in order to ensure the proper mode is enabled where required.  The following 
definitions are generally recognized, though differences are allowed as long as they are 
compatible with terminal procedures (TERPS) and standard instrument approach procedures [6]: 
a) Enroute Phase:  The aircraft is more than 15 nmi from the nearest airport or the 
conditions for Terminal, Approach, and Departure Phases are not met. 
 
b)  Terminal Phase:  The aircraft is 15 nmi or less from the nearest airport, the range to the 
nearest runway threshold is decreasing and the airplane is at or below a straight line 
drawn between the two points specified in Table 2-3 relative to the nearest runway. 
 
c)   Approach Phase:  Distance to nearest runway threshold is less than 5 nmi, height above 
the runway threshold is less than 1,900 ft, and distance to threshold is decreasing. 
 
Table 2-3 
Height Above Versus Distance To Runway 
Distance to Runway Height Above Runway 
15 nmi 3,500 ft 




d) Departure Phase:  The aircraft is defined to be in the departure phase from the point when 
it transitions to flight after leaving the runway, until it achieves an altitude of 1,500 ft 
AGL.  The system must use some combination of sensor parameters to determine when 
the aircraft is on the ground, and when it has transitioned to flight.  Commonly used 
sensor inputs include weight-on-wheels indications measured at the landing gear and 
airspeed thresholds. 
TAWS System Basic GPWS Functionality 
     In addition to the TAWS specific functionality listed above, the required TSO-C92 GPWS 
functionality must be included as well.  These basic GPWS protection modes, shown in Table 2-
1, are required to function even if the TAWS warning functionality fails due to a sensor, 





3. TESTING GPWS/TAWS SYSTEMS INSTALLED ON 
COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT 
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 
     Terrain warning systems, like all equipment installed on U.S. registered aircraft, must obtain 
airworthiness approval from the FAA through the Type Certification or Supplemental Type 
Certification process.  This involves documenting the design, performance, and all details of the 
system installation and integration with each type of aircraft [7].  In addition, a System Safety 
Assessment must be conducted to establish all hazards associated with the installation, and to 
define the failure modes and probability of failure, as well as impacts to aircraft operations, and 
required mitigations to defined hazards. 
FLIGHT TEST CONSIDERATIONS 
     The level of flight test required to validate a particular TAWS system installation depends on 
the type of aircraft, avionics structure, and whether or not that particular system has been certified 
in another application [7].  First time installations for a particular system or type of aircraft almost 
always require flight test demonstration of required functionality.  The addition of new sensors to 
previously certified systems usually requires a limited flight test program to demonstrate system 
operation in the modes affected by the sensor inputs.  In the case where upgraded TAWS systems 
are installed in a particular model aircraft that was previously equipped with some measure of 
GPWS equipment from the same manufacturer, flight testing of the previous functionality may 
not be required. 
FLIGHT TEST TECHNIQUES 
     In general, flight testing is as simple as demonstrating that each mode shows proper activation, 
deactivation after the cause of the warning is removed, and freedom from nuisance warnings.  
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GPWS Testing  
The methods required for demonstrating GPWS are described in the following sections [8]. 
Mode 1 
     Establish several descent rates below 3,000 ft AGL, continuing until the warning is activated, 
then pull-up until the warning is cleared.  Minimum altitudes to safely recover the aircraft at each 
descent rate are used as a safety back-up should the system fail to issue a warning. 
Mode 2 
     Flight across smoothly rising terrain in level flight at 500 ft above the highest terrain feature at 
different flap and gear settings. 
Mode 3 
     After a normal takeoff, climb to 300 ft AGL and slow climb rate until a slight descent is 
initiated to trigger a warning. 
Mode 4 
     Fly an approach with the appropriate approach flaps setting while leaving the gear up until the 
warning threshold is reached.  A go-around is initiated at a safe altitude. 
Mode 5 
     Conduct ILS approaches (During VMC) at varying deviations from the glide slope to trigger 
warnings. 
TAWS Functionality 
     TAWS functionality can be tested in a similar manner with relatively low risk [7] because of 





     Flight test can be conducted in any area where the terrain or obstacle elevation is known.  The 
terrain or feature can be overflown while straight and level at no lower than 300 ft above the 
known elevation to verify warning functionality. 
PDA Mode 
     The premature descent mode can be tested in any area within 10 nmi of an airport that is 
included in the terrain database.  The threshold limits for the warnings can be easily and safely 







4. APPLYING GPWS/TAWS SYSTEMS TO HIGH PERFORMANCE 
AIRCRAFT  
APPLICABILITY OF GPWS/TAWS SYSTEMS 
     Ground Proximity Warning and TAWS systems can be implemented in high performance 
military aircraft, though both the integration and operation of the systems is usually quite 
different from systems intended for use in commercial aircraft.  The operating environment and 
integration challenges combine to make these systems considerably different from their 
commercial counterparts.   
Integration 
     Most high performance aircraft have unique avionics systems structured for their particular 
mission.  These are usually based on state-of-the-art technology and are focused on providing the 
high performance required, as well as being able to fit in a physically confined location.  In 
addition, the system architecture many times is distributed throughout the airframe with 
considerable redundancy to increase survivability, but at a cost of increased complexity.  This 
requires that other systems to be  integrated must conform to unique interface requirements, which 
in turn drives a requirement for dedicated system development. 
Operation 
     In addition to integration challenges, the operating envelope of high performance aircraft 
drives system requirements to much greater complexity.  The fact that the aircraft routinely 
operate at high speed near terrain requires that the protection algorithms be based on completely 
different assumptions than those in use in commercial systems.  For instance, the altitude 
clearance allowed by such systems prior to issuing warnings must by virtue of the aircraft 
operating envelope be much smaller than commercial systems.  In addition, the variety of external 
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stores configurations, and their effects on aircraft performance and the available recovery margin 
adds to the problem.  The effects of nuisance cues on the aircrew also drive elements of the 
system design as well.  Repeated nuisance cues can drastically alter the assumptions of aircrew 
response, which must be assumed and modeled into the algorithms. 
Flight Testing 
     The following sections describe one system designed for use in a tactical military high 
performance aircraft, and the unique challenges presented by the environment in which it was 




5.  TAWS ON THE F/A-18 
OVERVIEW 
     The Enhanced Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) is the second generation of 
the embedded Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS), which was originally implemented 
on F/A-18C/D model aircraft [11].  Both GPWS and TAWS are safety back-up systems designed 
to reduce the probability of a Controlled-Flight-Into-Terrain (CFIT) type mishap in Navy tactical 
aircraft by alerting the aircrew when ground impact is imminent.   
     The original versions of GPWS were designed by the Naval Air Systems Command 
Embedded GPWS Integrated Product Team (IPT) and documented in the form of an “Algorithm 
Design Report”.  This report was provided to the F/A-18 prime contractor (McDonell Douglas) 
who implemented the design in assembly language on the aircraft’s mission computers.  After 
implementation, the algorithm was laboratory tested in the Manned Flight Simulator prior to 
flight testing on a test aircraft.  When the TAWS program was initiated, the decision was made to 
have the Embedded GPWS IPT not only design the algorithm, but also implement it in the Ada 
high level programming language.  This software was then hosted on the aircraft’s digital map 
computer to take advantage of the stored digital terrain data without facing the difficulty of 
transferring that information to the aircraft mission computers.  The algorithm is run on the 
Tactical Aircraft Moving Map Computer (TAMMAC) using inputs from aircraft sensors and the 
mission computers. 
 
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT  
     The original GPWS system is limited by its primary altitude sensor, the radar altimeter 
(RADALT).  Because the RADALT is a look-down sensor, it cannot be used to determine the 
terrain characteristics ahead of the aircraft.  A history of the terrain behind the aircraft is available 
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and could be used in some instances, but is not indicative of the approaching terrain.  This leaves 
effectively no protection against flight into rising terrain or during flight over mountains.  The 
TAWS system overcomes this limitation with the introduction of accurate aircraft positioning and 
a digital terrain database.  The TAWS computes the expected recovery trajectory, in three 
dimensions, and compares it with Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED).  One critical 
requirement is having accurate aircraft positioning relative to both the DTED database and the 
world.  The TAWS system combines data from many sensors to determine a position in three-
dimensional space that is used as the starting point for the recovery trajectory.  When the 
recovery trajectory intersects the DTED database, a warning is issued to the aircrew.  The 
warning is presented as an arrow on the Head-Up Display (HUD) that indicates the direction for 
recovery, and a directive voice warning that indicates the proper response based on the flight 
condition.  The arrow and the voice warning continue until the warning condition no longer 
exists.  The voice warnings available are:  “Pull-Up…Pull-Up”, “Roll-Left…Roll-Left”, “Roll-
Right…Roll-Right”, “Power…Power”, and “Check Gear”. 
     In the event that accurate positioning data or the DTED database is unavailable, the TAWS 
enters a mode that bases warnings solely on the altitude required to recover.  This “flat Earth” 
mode is very effective over water, as was proven during the earlier GPWS development. 
 
SYSTEM TRADEOFFS 
     The TAWS system was designed to minimize nuisance warnings.  Nuisance warnings are 
defined as warnings that the aircrew deems unnecessary based upon their intentions and view of 
the terrain.  If nuisance warnings are accepted as a “necessary cost” of protecting the aircraft and 
aircrew, TAWS becomes significantly less effective.  This negative training causes the aircrew to 
question each warning, thus delaying the start of the recovery if the aircrew deems the warning 
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valid.  Any delay in responding to the warning will have catastrophic consequences as the aircraft 
will no longer have sufficient altitude to successfully recover since TAWS warnings are issued at 
the last instant that recovery is possible given the aircraft’s calculated performance.  This design 
bias towards a minimization of nuisance warnings is required for this system because of the low-
altitude and dynamic maneuvering mission requirements of the F/A-18.  TAWS Warnings 
normally occur three to seven seconds prior to terrain impact.  The system requirements are for a 
nuisance warning percentage of less than 8% (threshold) with an objective of less than 3%.   
 
DESIGN DECISIONS 
Configurable Parameters  
     The TAWS was intended to provide support for multiple platforms without software 
modifications. (e.g., F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F).  Therefore platform-specific characteristics 
were identified and encapsulated as “configurable parameters” whose values may differ for each 
installation.  These parameters are loaded into predefined locations in the Digital Mapping 
Computer (DMC) so that TAWS can effectively be customized for the desired platform, and 
changes to the algorithm can be made without software modifications.  The configurable 
parameters are presented in appendix A, Table A-1.  These parameters are loaded into the aircraft 
on the mission data card inserted from the cockpit. 
I/O Approach 
     The TAWS system is hosted on the Tactical Aircraft Moving Map Computer (TAMMAC) and 
accepts its inputs from the aircraft mission computers in the form of three MIL-STD-1553 
messages. Each message includes a counter, which allows the system to ensure that the messages 
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come from the same MC frame, and are from a later frame than the last data received and 
processed.  
TAWS OPERATIONAL MODES 
     The TAWS uses three primary modes to define the level of operation, terrain database 
availability, and warning condition.  These three primary modes are BYPASS, COAST and 
OPERATE. 
BYPASS Mode  
     When System Mode is set to BYPASS, the TAWS processes all required inputs, but does not 
execute warnings.  The system mode is set to BYPASS when the sensor hierarchy determines that 
the system does not have enough sensor information to provide protection, or the aircraft is in the 
Weight-on-Wheels (WonW) condition. 
COAST Mode  
     When System Mode is set to COAST, the TAWS processes all components and issues 
warning cues based on an extrapolated height above terrain.  The System Mode is set to COAST 
when the System Mode is not in BYPASS, and DTED or accurate positioning is unavailable and 
RADALT data is unavailable.  Over relatively flat terrain, the extrapolated height above terrain is 
based upon the last known terrain elevation.  In the case where the last known height above 
terrain was varying (ie above mountainous terrain), the COAST mode is not used.   
OPERATE Mode 
     When the System Mode is set to OPERATE, the TAWS processes all components and issues 
warning cues based upon measured height above terrain.  The System Mode is set to OPERATE 
when the conditions for BYPASS and COAST are not met. 
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Terrain Definition Mode  
     In addition to the primary operating mode, the system defines a Terrain Definition Mode 
which is determined based on whether or not the TAWS is using the Re-arced Digital Terrain 
Elevation Data (RDTED) database for protection.  The Terrain Definition Mode can either be 
DTED or FLAT EARTH. 
DTED 
     When the Terrain Definition Mode is set to DTED (DTED mode), the TAWS provides 
protection against flight into all types of terrain (rising, level, and descending).  The Terrain 
Definition Mode is set to DTED when RDTED is available for the current location, the TAWS 
has accurately determined its position, and the system is not in the landing phase. 
FLAT EARTH 
     When the Terrain Definition Mode is set to FLAT EARTH, the system provides warnings only 
against descending flight into level or descending terrain.  The Terrain Definition Mode is set to 
FLAT EARTH when RDTED is unavailable (including over the ocean), or when the system 
cannot accurately determine its position, or is in the landing phase. 
 
SYSTEM WARNINGS 
     The system provides several different types of warnings loosely grouped into either GEAR or 
TRAJECTORY warnings. 
GEAR Warning 
     A GEAR warning is issued when the system determines that a gear-up landing is about to 
occur while in the landing phase of flight.   The criteria for setting the GEAR warning is: 
 • The Aircraft is below 150 feet AGL, and 
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 •  Is below 200 KCAS, and 
 •  The aircraft is descending, and 
 •  More than 60 seconds have elapsed since a waveoff or takeoff, and 
 •  The landing gear is not down and locked. 
 
     While in the landing flight phase, the system operates in the FLAT EARTH mode.  Protection 
is still provided by comparing the altitude required to recover the aircraft and the height above 
terrain, but once a landing attempt is confirmed, the TAWS adds additional protection to ensure 
that a gear-up landing is not about to happen.   The system Landing Phase is defined as: 
 
 •  Altitude less than 500 feet AGL, and 
 •  Airspeed less than 200 KCAS, and  
 •  More than 60 seconds since a waveoff or takeoff. 
 
     The GEAR Warning Mode is cleared when the TAWS receives the down-and-locked 
indication, the aircraft begins climbing, the height above terrain climbs above 150 feet, or the 
system leaves the landing phase.  In all warning and cancellation conditions, the warning 
condition (or cancellation criteria) must be met for three frames before the warning mode is 
actually set (or cleared) in the fourth frame.  These persistency timers protect the TAWS from 
erroneously setting warnings (or clearing warnings) based on bad transient input data. 
    
TRAJECTORY Warning 
     A TRAJECTORY warning is issued when the system determines that a high probability of a 
CFIT exists.  That is, the current flight path will intercept the ground unless an aggressive 
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recovery is initiated immediately.  This protection is available at all airspeeds and flight 
conditions. However, TAWS Warnings are inhibited when: 
 
 •  Within 6 seconds of WonW to weight-off-wheels transition, or 
 •  Within 1.1 seconds of transitioning from the BYPASS mode, or 
 •  The TAWS computed height-above-terrain is less than zero. 
 
SYSTEM SENSOR INPUTS 
      Signal processing selects data from many sources and produces what is deemed the most 
accurate Height Above Terrain (HAT), height above Mean Sea Level (MSL), aircraft velocities, 
position, and accelerations.  Two basic sources of height above terrain are used:  the RADALT, 
and the difference between aircraft MSL altitude and the terrain height from the RDTED 
database.  Error estimates are computed for each of these sources so that the proper weighting can 
be made for each one. 
     To achieve full performance, data is required from the following aircraft systems: Inertial 
Navigation System (INS), RADALT, Air Data Computer (ADC), and GPS. RDTED is also 
required from the Digital Map Computer (DMC).  Some failures (or unavailability) of these 
inputs will invalidate the TAWS, while other failures will only degrade performance to varying 
degrees. 
     Table A-2 (Appendix A) shows the hierarchy of sensors used for each input to the TAWS and 
the effects of sensor failures.  As an example, TAWS is in its fully capable mode when the INS 
reports valid attitude and acceleration, GPS is used for position (either aiding the INS or stand-
alone), and DTED is available. 
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Terrain Height Determination     
     The TAWS algorithm queries the DMC to acquire DTED information.  The DMC returns 
RDTED, which contains terrain heights (gridposts) spaced roughly 150 meters apart at mid-
latitudes.  The DMC returns an elevation, which is the weighted average (using bilinear 
interpolation) of the four closest RDTED gridposts surrounding the input latitude and longitude.  
The RDTED was derived from the original Level I DTED, which has gridposts spaced at 3 arc 
seconds, which equates to 100 meters at the equator, and decreases toward the poles.  The DTED 
is re-arced to support the TAMMAC map scale.  As more precise DTED becomes available, the 
TAMMAC will handle the Level-II data and pass it to the TAWS with no loss of functionality, 
but with greater precision. 
     The TAWS algorithm requests RDTED from the position on the globe that is one frame ahead 
of the current aircraft position instead of the “current” position.  This allows the system to 
measure the difference in neighboring gridpost heights, by collecting data one frame in front of 
the aircraft as well as behind.  The TAWS uses differences in neighboring gridpost heights in 
calculating a nuisance warning buffer.  The TAWS converts the DTED into feet and sets up an 
array of three DTED points: in front of (next), under (current), and behind (last) the aircraft.  
Three DTED points were chosen to minimize potential map registration errors in terrain data 
local to the aircraft position.  It looks up the next point each frame, passes the value of next to 
current, and current to last.  The “current” values are used for calculations, while the others are 
kept for determining variation in heights at neighboring locations. 
     The TAWS calculates the terrain variation by measuring the difference in DTED terrain 
heights both behind (where the aircraft has been) and ahead (where it is going) of the current 
point.  “Behind” is measured by finding the difference between DTED heights every frame, and 
exponentially decaying the values over time, so the variation over the last 2 gridposts 
(approximately 1000 ft) is weighted at 50%.  This method measures both jaggedness and rising or 
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falling terrain.  “Ahead” is measured by a “terrain roughness” parameter passed to the algorithm 
from the DMC, which finds the variation from a smooth slope of the next 15 gridpost heights 
(approximately 7400 ft).  Fifteen was chosen because it represents the length of a typical recovery 
trajectory.  These two measures are then averaged to get the estimate of terrain variation, which 
determines how large the DTED and RADALT errors might be. 
Determining Aircraft Position 
     The TAWS needs accurate position and altitude information to properly process potential 
warning conditions.  The system then uses the position error as an estimate of what is commonly 
known as “map registration error”.  The DTED database is populated with terrain heights for 
specific latitude / longitude locations, and if the aircraft queries the database with a location that it 
believes it is at, but in reality the aircraft is somewhere else, a map registration error occurs 
because the terrain height returned is for a location other than where the aircraft is. 
     When the GPS errors are acceptable (less than a defined limit of 80 ft), the position error 
parameter is set to the GPS horizontal position error (HERR) returned by the GPS receiver.  If the 
GPS validity bit is FALSE, the position error parameter grows at the rate of 2 ft/sec.  This is the 
expected INS drift rate, based on historical data for the ASN-139 INS.  The value of 80 ft was 
chosen for two reasons: first, the GPS accuracy specifications indicate (and historical data from 
F/A-18 tests validate) that when working properly, the HERR should be less than 80 ft the vast 
majority of the time.  Secondly, analyses of F/A-18 flight tests show that aircraft banking or 
pitching maneuvers tend to cause the GPS measurement errors (including the HERR) to 
immediately jump to much higher values (i.e., 400 ft), even while the aircraft maintains accurate 
position.  In other words, the HERR does not reflect the true position error for these temporary 
situations, so the TAWS assigns the position error to grow more slowly (with the INS drift). 
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Determining Aircraft Altitude And Altitude Error 
       When the GPS reported vertical error (VERR) is less than 80 ft, the GPS altitude is used for 
the best MSL altitude parameter.  If the VERR is greater than 80 ft, the barometric altitude is used 
instead, as historical data shows if the VERR is greater than 80 ft, the barometric altitude is likely 
to be more accurate and should be used instead.  In the case where the aircraft enters the transonic 
region, the last reported “non-transonic” value is used and updated using the inertial damped 
barometric parameter. 
     Accurate aircraft altitude is considerably more difficult to determine than position, because of 
sensor accuracy.   Signal Processing keeps track of which MSL sensor is being used, so that 
adjustments can be made to the height-above-terrain estimate whenever the logic switches among 
the various choices.  Sensory hierarchy is as follows: 
GPS Altitude 
     The GPS altitude value is used when the VERR has been less than 80 ft within the past 50 
seconds.  If the VERR is acceptable (< 80 ft), the altitude error is set equal to the VERR.  When 
the VERR is greater than 80 ft, the estimate of altitude error is increased by 2 ft/sec only if the 
INS altitude differs from the GPS altitude by more than the altitude error estimate.  This is done 
so that a spike in bad GPS data will not instantaneously raise the estimate of the altitude error.   
Instead, it will grow by as much as 100 ft over 50 seconds, and only then if the GPS altitude 
really is different than the INS BARO altitude. 
INS Altitude 
     The INS BARO altitude is used when INS is valid, and GPS is not valid.  First, there is a 
check to see if the INS altitude differs from the ADC barometric altitude by more than 800 ft, 
while the aircraft is not in the transonic region.  This is done because the F/A-18 has altitude-
processing logic, which can add a 900-ft bias to the INS altitude while transonic.  This check 
ensures INS BARO altitude is not used in these conditions.  The worst case error specification for 
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barometric altitude error is 8.3% of altitude, so to estimate the one-sigma error, the larger of 75 ft 
and one-half of the specification error (4.15%) is used.  The altitude error is increased  by 2 ft/sec 
until the error reaches the one-sigma value.  However, when the BARO and GPS altitudes agree, 
the altitude is assumed good and the error estimate will not grow larger. 
Barometric Altitude 
     The lowest priority is the ADC barometric altitude: and is used when both the GPS and INS 
are not valid. 
 
CFIT PROTECTION 
    The Protection component of the TAWS determines if ground impact is imminent for the two 
mutually exclusive warning modes, GEAR and TRAJECTORY.  If impact is imminent, the 
appropriate warning mode is set and the warning is issued.  In most cases, CFIT protection is 
provided by checking the predicted recovery trajectory against the terrain database and 
determining if the two intersect.  When they do intersect, the TRAJECTORY Warning Mode is 
set until the predicted trajectory no longer intersects the terrain database.  When the TAWS is in 
the FLAT EARTH mode, the terrain database is not used for determining a warning condition.  In 
this case, the TRAJECTORY Warning Mode is set when the altitude required to recover the 
aircraft is greater than or equal to the current height above the terrain plus a clearance altitude.  
This is applicable only while over level or descending terrain.  No protection into rising terrain is 
provided while in FLAT EARTH mode. 
     The TRAJECTORY Warning Mode provides protection by monitoring the altitude required to 
recover the aircraft and the height above the terrain.  Depending upon the sensor validity, 
availability of DTED, and flight phase, this may be accomplished by projecting the recovery 
trajectory in three-dimensions and overlaying it on the RDTED database (DTED Terrain 
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Definition Mode), or comparing the altitude required for recovery to the height above terrain 
(FLAT EARTH Terrain Definition Mode). 
Recovery Trajectories 
     Within the DTED mode, two recovery trajectories are computed to overlay the RDTED 
database.  The Vertical Recovery Trajectory (VRT) assumes the pilot will roll to wings-level, 
then apply a longitudinal pull to a constant 5g (or 80% of the aircraft available g if Nz limited).  
The Oblique Recovery Trajectory (ORT) assumes the pilot will simply apply a longitudinal pull 
at whatever the current bank angle is.  At zero bank angle, the ORT and VRT are identical.  The 
two recovery trajectories are shown in Figure 5-1. 
     For a warning condition to exist, both calculated trajectories must intersect the terrain in the 
RDTED database, which helps avoid nuisance warnings.  This is especially important in 
mountainous terrain where the aircrew can see a turn in a valley and intend to maneuver through 
 
Figure 5-1 
VRT and ORT Recovery Trajectories 
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it, but the VRT detects potential ground impact because of the assumption that the aircraft will 
roll to wings-level and then pull up.  This assumption causes the VRT to intersect the side of the 
valley that the aircrew is already aware of and maneuvering around.  Within the FLAT EARTH 
mode, the altitude required for recovery is based solely on the altitude lost during the VRT. 
Recovery Phases 
     The recovery is broken into five phases: pilot response, roll response, G delay phase, G-onset 
phase, and dive phase.  The intention is to accurately model both the VRT and ORT in real time 
according to the aircraft’s instantaneous performance capability.  In each phase of the recovery 
(except for the dive phase), the time to complete that phase is computed and used in kinematic 
equations that define position, velocity, and acceleration. 
Pilot response phase 
     The pilot response phase is the period from when the aircrew receives the warning cues to 
when the first action is taken to affect the recovery (lateral stick for roll-out, longitudinal stick for 
pull-up, etc.).  This “processing” time is rather short for a pilot with high situational awareness, 
and longer for a pilot who has lost situational awareness.  Simulator and flight test from the 
GPWS development program showed that a highly aware pilot could react as fast as 0.4 seconds, 
and an unaware pilot could take 1.0 second or longer. 
     Predicting the pilot response time is very difficult due to this range in actual responses.  While 
the goal is to protect the unaware pilot, selection of too large a pilot response time leads to 
nuisance warnings for the aware pilot.  Therefore, based on the results of eight years of GPWS 
development and testing, a pilot response time of 1.3 seconds is used for the TAWS.  This value 
was increased after the first phase of flight test due to the desire to increase protection and 
because nuisance warnings were non-existent.  
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Roll Response Phase 
     The roll response phase is the period from when the aircrew initiates recovery to when the 
aircraft reaches the calculated target bank angle required to clear terrain.  If no roll is required for 
the recovery (VRT with small bank angle or ORT), the roll response phase will be nonexistent for 
that frame.   
     The predicted roll response takes into account the platform-specific performance 
characteristics.  The roll performance characteristics assume that 50% lateral stick is used for 
initial bank angles less than 70°, and 75% lateral stick for those greater than 70°.  These 
conservative assumptions allow the aircrew to roll faster than designed which may increase the 
bottom-out altitude.   
     When the TAWS is in the DTED mode, the roll response phase, as well as the subsequent 
phases, must be computed twice per frame.  The first pass is for the VRT, which assumes a target 
bank angle of zero.  The second pass is for the ORT, which assumes the target bank angle is the 
bank angle at the end of the pilot response phase.   
G Onset Delay Phase 
     The aircraft now has the lift vector pointing in the desired direction when the aircrew begins 
pulling to the target normal acceleration.  As the pilot applies aft stick, the horizontal stabilizer 
moves to a more trailing-edge up condition.  This causes downward motion of the tail and 
eventually the nose pitch-up normally associated with the stick deflection.  The tail moves 
downward because the deflection of the horizontal stabilizer creates a downward force.  This 
downward force instantaneously reduces the overall lift the aircraft is generating though it is 
quickly compensated for by the nose pitching up.  The reduction of lift before it increases is seen 
as a short-term reduction in normal acceleration on the aircraft.  This is referred to as a non-
minimum phase response and is accounted for in this phase.      
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     In addition, the F/A-18 flight control system also uses a G-limiter to ensure the aircrew does 
not exceed the structural limit of the airframe.  The limit value for the G-limiter is reduced during 
transonic flight to alleviate overstresses due to the highly dynamic nature of transonic flight.  
Because TAWS allows for accelerations (and decelerations) during the predicted recovery 
trajectories, and the change in G-limiter threshold during transonic flight can greatly affect the 
recovery trajectory, the TAWS must account for this transonic “G-bucket”.  This means that in 
addition to the predicted ground and air speeds, the TAWS must predict the mach number at 
various points of the recovery. 
G Onset Phase 
     The G-onset phase of the recovery is the time from the application of aft stick to the time that 
the target normal acceleration is achieved.  This may be in the vertical plane (VRT) or in an 
oblique plane (ORT).  If the current normal acceleration is greater than or equal to the target, 
there is no G-onset phase.  The target G-onset rate is computed from the airspeed, gross weight, 
and external stores configuration.  This estimate is based upon historical flight test data and an 
F/A-18 high-fidelity airframe simulation.  The assumed recovery technique is ramped aft stick 
(over 0.75 seconds) sufficient to achieve the target normal acceleration. 
Dive Phase 
     Once the recovery enters the dive phase, the required pilot maneuvering is over.  Above 
approximately corner speed (and for the ORT), the dive phase is assumed a constant normal 
acceleration constant airspeed maneuver whose trajectory is very closely approximated by an 
ellipse.  Below cornering speed (and for the VRT), the dive phase is assumed to have axial 
acceleration due to the pilot applying maximum power.  This axial acceleration causes an 
increase in airspeed and therefore an increase in the target normal acceleration for the dive phase 
(especially notable during slow speed conditions).  For the vertical recovery trajectory, the ellipse 
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is in the vertical plane.  For the oblique recovery trajectory, the ellipse is rotated about the flight 
path in the body axis and about vertical in the inertial axis.  
Recovery Trajectory Calculation 
     The VRT begins at the current aircraft position and ends when the aircraft is climbing 
vertically.  Figure 5-2 shows a VRT broken into its phases.   
   Fifteen samples are taken along the trajectory and are spaced as: 
 •  3 samples from the roll phase 
 •  3 samples from the G-onset phase  





Vertical Recovery Trajectory [11] 
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     Fifteen samples are used because in the worst case, the aircraft is capable of traversing fifteen 
RDTED gridposts during the recovery (15 gridposts = 7380 feet).  This division of samples was 
chosen to reflect phases where the recovery could indeed be completed.  That is, due to the pilot 
response characteristics, a recovery has very little chance of being completed during the pilot 
response phase.  Similarly, the G-delay phase is so short (< 0.5 sec) and bounded by the roll and 
G-onset phases that it is effectively represented by them. 
     The oblique recovery trajectory is computed after the VRT computations are complete.  The 
ORT, like the VRT, begins at the current aircraft position, but it ends at different points, 
depending upon the bank angle.  The ORT uses between 10 and 15 samples along the trajectory, 
shown in Figure 5-3.  This is done to avoid nuisance warnings during maneuvers in confined 
areas such as canyons or below mountain peaks where the ORT may actually predic t an 
intersection behind the turning aircraft.  Even though the number of samples used in the terrain 
intersection computation is variable, fifteen points are still computed along the entire ellipse. 
Warning Determination 
    Once the samples for each recovery trajectory are computed, the terrain elevation at each 
sample is compared with the predicted aircraft altitude along the trajectory plus the clearance 
altitude, which in the case of the F/A-18 is 50 ft.  Each trajectory sample contains the latitude, 
longitude and altitude of the aircraft along the trajectory.  The latitude and longitude are used to 
query the DTED database for the elevation at that point.  When the terrain elevation returned 
from the DTED database is greater than or equal to the predicted altitude, a potential warning 
exists. 
     When the RDTED terrain elevation exceeds the predicted altitude at any sample, the terrain 





Oblique Recovery Trajectory [11] 
 
the trajectory, thus making the trajectory appear like the shape of a “T”. This is done because in 
mountainous terrain, a potential warning at one latitude/longitude may not require a warning at a 
different location. Any map registration errors or the potential of aircraft maneuvering during the 
recovery are accounted for with the “T” when ascertaining that a warning is required.  The 
distance right and left of the trajectory to check is the maximum of the position error and one-
eighth of the distance from beginning of trajectory to the intersection point in the horizontal 
plane.  Only when all three terrain elevations are greater than or equal to the trajectory altitude 
will a potential warning exist. 
     A TRAJECTORY warning can be set only when both the VRT and ORT are detecting an 
intercept.  Whenever trajectory protection detects an intercept (along the trajectory and "T" for 
VRT, or along the trajectory for ORT), a persistency counter for the appropriate trajectory is 
incremented until four consecutive frames of intercept occur.  Once one of the persistency 
counters reaches four, a warning is set as soon as the persistency counter for the "other" trajectory 
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becomes non-zero.   The system thus determines which trajectory describes "the way out" and is 
conveyed to the aircrew as the directive recovery cue.  This is used by the mission computer to 
determine whether the recovery arrow on the HUD should be ground or aircraft stabilized as 
described below.    Once the TRAJECTORY Warning Mode has been set, it is cleared by four 
consecutive frames of no intercepts on either trajectory. 
     When the TAWS is in the FLAT EARTH mode, there is no need to compute the trajectory 
points as above since no digital terrain data is used for comparison.  FLAT EARTH mode 
requires only the altitude required to arrest the downward velocity to the targeted value.  This is 
determined using the kinematic updates from each phase.  The end of the recovery while in the 
FLAT EARTH mode occurs when the aircraft is parallel to the terrain, and is determined from the 
terrain slope that is computed in the signal processing component.   
Clearance Altitude  
The clearance altitude is the designed bottom-out altitude for the recovery.  The value of the 
clearance altitude is based upon whether the TAWS is in the landing phase or not.  While in the 
landing phase, the clearance altitude is the configurable parameter Landing_Clearance_Altitude, 
the altitude at which the target downward velocity is to be achieved during landing.  While not in 
the landing phase, the clearance altitude is Cruise_Clearance_Altitude.  (The configurable 
parameters and their values are listed in Table A-2) 
 
TAWS WARNING MECHANIZATION 
     When the system determines a warning is in order, the mission computers provide both visual 




     The audio cues are intended to be the primary warning cue, and are presented simultaneously 
with the visual cues.  The voice warnings are 3-6 dB above normal cockpit communications with 
a female voice inflection that communicates the sense of urgency of the situation.  Multiple audio 
warnings will be issued during the recovery if the situation requires.  Each audio cue is issued so 
that the aircrew will hear the entire directive cue, and cannot be interrupted.  This is a hardware 
limitation with the amplifier, control intercommunication (ACI), which generates all F/A-18 
audio cueing.  The warnings are issued until the warning condition no longer exists. 
     Aural warnings consist of the following cues: 
 •  “Roll Left, Roll Left” 
 •  “Roll Right, Roll Right” 
 •  “Pull-Up, Pull Up” 
 •  “Power, Power” 
 •  “Check Gear” 
     Multiple aural cues may be required for a single recovery.  For example, most ORT recoveries 
issue a “Roll Left/Right” followed by “Pull Up”. 
Visual Cues 
The video cueing consists of the “TAWS arrow” presented in the HUD with at least the same 
intensity as the surrounding HUD symbology.  The arrow is 50 mr wide and 150 mr high (for the 
F/A-18 implementation), drawn around the optical center of the HUD.  The arrow has a notch in 
the bottom so that the direction of the arrow can be ascertained from either the top or bottom.  In 
some cases, the top of the arrow may not be instantaneously visible in the HUD.  The arrow 
remains on the HUD as long as the Warning Mode is set. 
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     There are two orientations for the arrow in the HUD, set according to the commanded 
recovery trajectory.  For the Vertical Recovery Trajectory, the arrow will be presented 
perpendicular to the horizon; that is, pointing “up” in the inertial coordinate system, as shown in 
Figure 5-4 where the aircraft is shown rolled 45 deg left. 
     For the Oblique Recovery Trajectory, the arrow will remain fixed to the aircraft’s Z-axis 
pointing “up”, as shown in Figure 5-5.  The orientation of the arrow is dependent upon the 
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6. FLIGHT TESTING TAWS ON THE F/A-18  
 
     Just as the maneuvering envelope and mission requirements define the system design for 
terrain warning systems on military aircraft, the requirements for testing such a system are 
likewise expanded when compared with those intended for commercial aircraft.  Flight testing the 
TAWS system recently developed for the F/A-18 provides an example. 
BACKGROUND 
     Development of the F/A-18 TAWS system required a large number of tests to validate the 
approach and assumptions inherent in the system design.  Numerous simulation events were 
required to tweak the algorithms to provide the maximum amount of protection while minimizing 
nuisance warnings.  Flight testing was also required to validate that the system did not provide 
nuisance warnings while the aircraft was operating in it intended environment performing 
tactically relevant missions.   
           The TAWS test effort was undertaken as an integrated system test involving multiple test 
techniques using both simulation and flight tests.   Complementary use of simulation and flight 
test using altitude safety buffers and a host of risk mitigations was the key to developing a robust 
safety system that minimizes nuisance warnings.  The objectives of the flight test program are 
summarized in Table 6-1. 
     Flight testing was carried out in several phases with both F/A-18C/D and E/F variant aircraft, 
which are aerodynamically very different, in order to verify that the configurable parameters were 
optimized for each.  Two categories of flight testing were required: performance flight testing and 
nuisance cue testing. Since TAWS was designed to be a last-ditch safety system, it obviously 




F/A-18 TAWS Test Requirements and Evaluation Criteria [10] 
REQUIREMENT TESTS CRITERIA 
Ensure warning cues 
appear at the design 
thresholds/time 
Pilot maneuvers aircraft to 
generate terrain closure, excessive 
sink rate, excessive bank angle, 
floor altitude and gear up 
warnings.  Recover aircraft.  




components and bottom 
out altitudes. 
Pilot maneuvers aircraft into 
trajectory warning.  Upon receipt 
of aural/visual cues, pilot 
executes recovery. 
Actual vs. computed 
warning altitude within 
greater of either: 
10% of trajectory altitude or 
100 ft. 
Ensure that the number of 
nuisance cues has been 
minimized 
Normal fleet operations which 
approach warning boundaries: 
• Low level flight operations 
• Simulated weapons 
delivery at minimum 
altitudes 
• LAT 
• Off nominal approaches 
• VFR approaches, etc. 
Nuisance Cues:  less than 
8% of the intended 
maneuvers/events.  For Low 
level flight operations 1 
minute of flight equals 1 
event. 
 Pnw less than 8% 
(threshold) 
 Pnw less than 3% 
(objective) 
Ensure that assumed 
parameters are sufficient 
to prevent CFIT 
following loss of 
Situational Awareness 
(SA). 
Investigate pilot response, 
roll out, G-onset, 
sustained G, and bottom 
out altitude. 
Test pilot closes his eyes to 
simulate loss of SA;  aircraft is 
then maneuvered into simulated 
CFIT situation by the safety pilot.  
Test pilot initiates recovery at 
warning. 
 Psw greater than 60% 
(threshold) 
 Psw greater than 90% 
(objective) 
Test for false cues caused 
by spurious signals (data 
spikes, wingman, power 
interruptions, etc.) 
All flight tests and formation 
flight. 




of special techniques were developed to safely conduct flight test while measuring system 
performance to the maximum extent possible.  
UNIQUE SAFETY PRECAUTIONS 
     Because of the nature of this flight testing, there was a considerable amount of attention given 
to planning the profiles.  The desire to test as close to the ground as possible for accurate aircraft 
performance and pilot perception needed to be delicately balanced with the required altitude 
buffer in order to ensure safety.  Some unique methods were developed to provide as much 
margin for safety as possible, while fulfilling the flight test requirements. 
Flight Test Safety Buffer Altitude  
     The aircraft mission computer software was modified to allow the use of a temporary false 
floor altitude that raised the perceived terrain elevation above the real terrain, allowing flight test 
to be conducted farther from the ground.  When the aircraft was configured for flight test, the 
pilot was presented with an option to enter a buffer altitude between 0 and 12,700 feet .  This 
buffer is then subtracted from the TAWS final height above terrain parameter and MSL altitudes 
used in all warning calculations.  This buffer did not change the indicated altitude presented to the 
pilot, or the responses of the aircraft low-altitude warning system which is composed of an MSL 
altitude warning setting and the radar altimeter (RADALT) warning setting. 
     Each time the buffer was enabled or the altitude setting changed, the buffer check procedure 
was performed to verify that it was working properly.  This involved descending at approximately 
300 fpm to verify the warning at 50 ft above the false floor altitude.  The 300 fpm was used to 
standardize the procedure at a descent rate low enough so that the warning would not appear 
higher than the minimum 50 ft warning provided when a slow descent toward the ground was 
occurring.  (Higher descent rates would move the warning higher.)  The buffer check flight test 
card is presented in Figure 6-1. 
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Profile Planning 
     All dive profiles were planned using the Aircraft Target Area Maneuvering Simulation 
(ATAMS) weaponeering program using worst-case aircraft gross weight and test conditions.  
Tolerances for dive angle and airspeed were defined, and using the worst case of all parameters 
that contribute, the expected altitude loss was calculated for every event.  The ATAMS altitudes 
were used because they are slightly more conservative than those derived from the TACMAN 
dive recovery charts.  
    The expected altitude lost was used to determine the “terminate run altitude” which was the 
minimum altitude allowable to ensure the aircraft recovered above the “bottom out altitude.”   
Table 6-2 shows the bottom out altitudes that were used, which differed as a function of dive 
angle. 
     Using the terminate run altitude and minimum bottom out altitude, the required buffer altitude 
could be determined so that the expected TAWS warning could be forced away from the terrain 
for testing.  Buffer altitudes were chosen so that there was ample time during the dive for the 
expected TAWS warning to be given and the recovery started prior to the terminate run altitude.  
Figure 6-2 shows the relationship between the various altitude parameters. 
Safety Observers and Displays  
     Even though the safety altitudes were defined, it was determined that the test team needed to 
monitor the altitudes and other safety critical parameters to be prepared to make knock-it-off calls 
at the terminate run altitude if the TAWS system failed to provide warnings.  The test team was  
Table 6-2 
Minimum Dive Recovery Bottom Out Altitudes 
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1.   Set Safety Buffer:
Unit 28
Address 21016
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3.  Set Baro 8,100
3.  Descend at 300 fpm
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organized with a safety observer and the test conductor monitoring displays in the control room to 
provide an independent abort call if required during each run. 
Telemetry Data System 
     To do this, a number of aircraft parameters had to be telemetered to the ground.  The standard 
flight test telemetry (TM) system on the F/A-18 test aircraft was capable of monitoring all of the 
required parameters, and sending them to the China Lake Range Control Center (RCC) bays in 
real time.  The required parameters are listed in Table 6-3. 
     In addition, it was determined that the test team should use an alternate altitude source to make 
the abort determination in case the altitude sensors aboard the aircraft (which were of course also 
used as inputs to the TAWS system) should provide inaccurate data.  For this reason, the aircraft 
was configured with an Advanced Range Data System (ARDS) pod, which uses differential GPS 
to determine precise Time/Space/Position Information (TSPI) and relayed it to the RCC bays. 
Safety Displays 
     Because of the very dynamic nature of the safety data, a determination was made to design 
some special displays to show the required information graphically in order to ensure that it was 
evaluated correctly during each event.  For the CFIT protection flights, a graphical display was 
developed which plotted altitude and dive angle against a template showing the dive angle 
tolerances and terminate run altitude, so that it was relatively easy to determine if the aircraft was 
outside the envelope which determined the altitude lost during recovery.  A sample display is 
shown in Figure 6-3.  Note that the altitude is shown as AGL altitude.  As mentioned, an 
independent altitude source was used to drive the safety display, however, the ARDS pod 
provided only MSL altitude, which was converted to worst case AGL altitude by assuming a 




Required Real-Time Data Parameters [10] 
Critical Test Parameters Critical Safety Parameters 
Airspeeds (VCAL, VTRUE) Airspeeds (VCAL, VTRUE) 
Dive Angle  Dive Angle  
Radar Altitude Altitude (ft AGL) 
Baro Altitude Normal Acceleration (Nz (G)) 
TSPI Altitude  Mach Number 
Vertical Velocity Angle of Attack 
Bank Angle   
Stick position  
TSPI Lat/Long  
Hot Mike to RCC  
 
 
conservative estimate of actual aircraft AGL altitude, depending on the terrain below.  The dive 
angle data was taken from the aircraft telemetry stream. Several other similar displays were 
developed for use during nuisance warning testing, where no altitude buffer was used.  The Low-
Altitude Tactics (LAT) display is shown in Figure 6-4. 
    LAT maneuvers were performed over level ground, so the known terrain elevation was used in 
conjunction with the ARDS altitude data to provide accurate AGL altitude for use on the display 
without resorting to aircraft derived data.  This provided for an extra measure of protection with 
accuracy that supported the desire to test to a minimum altitude of 200 ft. 
     A similar display, shown in Figure 6-5 was used for weapons delivery profile nuisance 
warning testing. 
Safety Pilot 
     The use of a back-seat safety pilot was mandated for some of the testing, to ensure that if the 
primary pilot were to be disoriented, there would be some means of recovering the aircraft.  This 
was particularly important for the “closed eyes” CFIT testing where the front seat pilot was 
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 suffered a loss of situational awareness – a primary reason for implementing the TAWS system.  
The primary test aircraft was configured in the “trainer configuration” with flight controls in both 
the front and aft cockpits. 
Simulator Requirements 
     In addition to the heavy use of the Manned Flight Simulator for algorithm development, the 
simulator was used to pre-fly all test points.  It was deemed a safety requirement that all aircrew 
develop and maintain proficiency for TAWS testing prior to actual flight test events.  This also 
helped develop the starting points for some of the more difficult scenarios, which were very 
dependent on technique used to get the aircraft to the required point in the sky with the proper 
attitude and airspeed desired.  Table 6-4 summarizes the simulator requirements for both primary 
Test Pilot and Safety Pilot for the different events. 
ADDITIONAL SAFETY PRECAUTIONS 
     In addition, a number of common flight test “best practices” were used in combination to 
assure maximum safety.  The concept of “build-up” was applied, which dictated that the events 
be done in a particular order with the functional flights flown first.  This also drove the desire to 
flight test at higher altitudes before moving the profiles either faster or lower.  Likewise, practice 
events and those with lower g-onset rates were flown first. 
     Also, the Naval Air Systems Command Test Hazard Analysis process was applied to all 
aspects of this flight test program to identify, categorize and attempt to mitigate all identified 
risks.  Each identified risk was mitigated in some way, and then the residual risk was assessed for 
severity and probability in order to categorize the remaining risk.  The residual risk matrix is 









Pilot/Flight Simulator Proficiency Requirements [10] 
 
Flight MFS flight Practice Flight 
Functional Test Required within 45 days prior to functional test flight. None required. 
Low level 1 None required. None required. 
LAT Test pilot 2 Required within  30 days prior to LAT practice flight.6 
Required within 14 days prior to 
LAT test flight.6 
LAT Safety pilot 3 
Required within  30 days prior to 
LAT practice flight.6 
Back or front seat practice flight 
required within 14 days prior to 
LAT test flight. 4,6 
CFIT Test pilot 7 Required within 45 days prior to CFIT test flight. None required. 
CFIT Safety pilot 
7 
Required within 45 days prior to 




Required within 45 days prior to 
weapons test flight. None required. 
Off Nominal 
Approaches 5 
None required None required. 
 Notes: 1. Must have flown 500 ft low level test flight prior to 200 ft (same route). 
  2. Must have been F/A-18 LAT qualified. 
  3. Must have previously completed a LAT instructor course. 
  4. Must have flown 500 ft or lower low level within 14 days prior to LAT practice 
flight. 
  5. LSO required 
  6. Must have flown within 7 days prior to flying LAT. 
  7.  Refresher required within 15 days of test flight. 
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     The complete Test Hazard Analysis for the F/A-18 TAWS test program is listed in appendix 
B.  The overall flight test category was assessed as Category B, which determined the level of 
oversight and test team qualifications.  
     Another standard flight test practice that was used was the use of chase aircraft.  This was 
mandated for some flights, in order to provide an external appraisal of potential dangerous 
attitude trends while in the low-level environment.  This was primarily used for the LAT nuisance 
testing, and is representative of fleet training practice. 
     The aforementioned test techniques and practices were all implemented in order to minimize 
risk.  The following sections describe the flight tests in detail as well as the test techniques used 
to ensure safety.   
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE TESTING 
     Performance flight tests were segregated into three types, and conducted in accordance with 
logical build-up for a developmental system. 
Functional Warning Verification 
      The first phase of flight test was dedicated to verification of basic system functionality.  The 
flight test safety buffer altitude (discussed in a later section) was verified, an evaluation of aircraft 
positioning and DTED accuracy was performed, as well as a verification of the graceful 
degradation of the system when DTED data was invalid or position information was limited. 
After basic warning functionality was verified by diving towards the ground (with safety buffer), 
the forward looking capability of the system was evaluated.  This was done by picking a terrain 
feature on the range with abrupt sides and flying directly toward it to verify warnings.  Figure 6-6 
shows the terrain feature used (renamed “TAWS Mountain” by the test team).   
     These tests were conducted using several profiles with the aircraft RADALT both on and off, 

















A - Frequent UA UA Risk Category C Risk Category B 
B - Probable  UA Risk Category C Risk Category C Risk Category A 
C - 
Occasional 
(Note 1) Risk Category C Risk Category B Risk Category A 




1.  The determination of a test project whose residual risk assessment falls under I/C will 
require up front discussions with TCT prior to proceeding with the test program 
development. 
2.  Assignment of Risk Category where residual risk falls under I/D or II/D will require up 
front  discussions with the TCT to determine whether Risk Category A or B is applicable. 
3. UA - Unacceptable risk, project residual risk too high to proceed. 
4. Risk Category C - Test or activities which present a significant risk to personnel, 
equipment or property, even after all precautionary/corrective actions are taken. 
5. Risk Category B - Test or activities which present a greater risk to personnel, equipment 
or property than normal operations. 













Forward Looking Analysis Testing Terrain Feature 
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and wingtip ARDS pods.  The first was a level approach to the mountain using a 1,000 ft buffer 
as depicted in Figure 6-7.  (The peak was at 5,600 ft MSL) 
     Second was a diving approach to the mountain shown in Figure 6-8.  This was also performed 
with the RADALT both on and off.  The points marked “B” and “C” were the terminate run 
altitude and planned bottom out altitude respectively. 
     The third scenario was a climbing approach to the terrain feature.  This was conducted only 
with the aircraft RADALT on and is shown in Figure 6-9. 
CFIT Protection 
     The next phase of testing was the CFIT protection evaluation of the system, and was the most 
dynamic.  This involved maneuvering the aircraft toward terrain at varying rates to determine the 
accuracy of the warnings and terrain clearance during the recovery.  This was done with a variety 
of safety buffer altitudes over level and mountainous terrain with the aircraft configured in one of 
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Climbing Approach Forward Looking Analysis 
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 weight configuration called the “interdiction” (INT) load were used for most tests to verify the 
edges of the system performance envelope.  In addition, an asymmetric load (“ASYM”) was 
defined to verify the algorithm’s accuracy when the aircraft’s roll rate and roll limiter were 
invoked due to an asymmetric configuration.  The CR or “Cruise Configuration”, which consisted 
of gear up and flaps in “auto”, was used for most testing, although the “Power Approach” (PA) 
Configuration of gear down with flaps fully extended was used to test landing pattern scenarios.  
The F/A-18E/F aircraft external stores stations are depicted in Figure 6-10, and the external stores 
loads are presented in Table 6-6. 
     CFIT protection flights utilized a “Test Pilot” in the front cockpit, and a “Safety Pilot” at the 
controls in the back cockpit.  To thoroughly evaluate the entire system, the effects of a disoriented 
pilot needed to be included in the recovery.  To do this, each run began with the Safety Pilot 
maneuvering the aircraft into the point, while the Test Pilot turned his head, closed his eyes and 
performed some mental task during the setup to induce a loss of situational awareness.  When the 
TAWS aural warning occurred, the Test Pilot reacted to the warning and recovered the aircraft as 
if his life depended on it.  The entire Test Pilot response and recovery, including the initial 
reaction, g-onset rate, roll rate and intuitive nature of the recovery cues (i.e. did the Test Pilot 
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where a “crash” occurred, and the aircraft flew below the buffer altitude, the data were used to re-
stimulate the simulator to understand where algorithm adjustments were required.  
     The Safety Pilot was prepared to take control of the aircraft if the Test Pilot reacted incorrectly 
to the warning cues, or initiated a recovery at the terminate run altitude if no warning was 
generated. 
     In addition, practice runs with the Test Pilot’s eyes open were conducted for the most 
aggressive runs in order to mitigate risk.  This allowed the aircrew to become familiar with the g-
onset required to avoid aircraft overstress during testing. 
CFIT Protection Over Level Terrain 
     CFIT flights over level terrain were conducted with both FE/CL and INT loadings with test 
conditions ranging from 150 KCAS to transonic (0.92 IMN) airspeeds, aircraft attitudes of level 
to 120° AOB, and dive angles between level and 45° at the warning point.  Each loading required 
a different test setup in terms of safety buffer altitudes because of the changes to aircraft 
performance caused by the differences in gross weight and drag.  A summary of the test points 
and their safety buffer altitudes are shown in Tables 6-7 and 6-8.  
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CFIT Protection Over Mountains 
     Testing over varied terrain provided some additional challenges to the test team because of the 
assumptions that needed to be made to implement the safety buffers.  The safety buffers and 
subsequent altitude calculations for terminate run altitude and expected warnings relied on 
knowing the actual ground level below the aircraft.  Over mountainous terrain the worst case 
(highest local terrain feature) had to be assumed for safety.  Therefore, if the aircraft was not over 
this terrain feature during the setup, warnings would not be triggered at the expected altitudes, 
and the terminate run altitude would be penetrated causing a knock it off call by the safety 
observer.  To mitigate this, the buffer altitudes had to be moved up to allow some “slop” to 
account for this while still providing the required worst case safety independent of terrain. 
     Due to the varied terrain, it was also determined that these tests should be performed with the 
Test Pilot’s eyes open using only the FE/CL stores configuration.  Actual performance of the 
entire system was extrapolated using the pilot response information gathered while testing over 
level terrain.  Likewise, aircraft performance at the heavy gross weight configuration was verified 
sufficiently over level terrain.  Figure 6-11 shows the actual terrain used for testing, with the 
highest terrain elevation noted.  Table 6-9 shows the list of test points and their associated buffer 
altitudes. 
Asymmetric Dive Recoveries 
     A subset of the CFIT dive recoveries was tested with the ASYM external stores configuration, 
which resulted in asymmetry near the aircraft limit.  The test was conducted over level terrain 
with the Test Pilot’s eyes open.  Risk mitigations included build-up consisting of practice runs at 
stepped up altitudes and before the PA configuration test as well as the safety observers and 
displays located in the control room.  Table 6-10 depicts the buffer and planned event altitudes 





     Table 6-7 

















































































































F5.P1 CR 250 5 ± 2 0 7586 5100 5150 2982 
F5.P2 CR 550 25 ± 2 0 9118 5100 5150 6258 
F5.1 CR 550 40 ± 4 40L 11322 5100 5150 9786 
F5.2 CR 450 30 ± 5 120L 8884 3700 3750 7862 
F5.3 CR 450 35 ± 3 30L 8265 3700 3750 7161 
F5.4 CR 550 25 ± 2 0 7718 3700 3750 6258 
F5.5 CR 250 30 ± 5 120L 6983 3000 3050 6230 
F5.6 CR 350 30 ± 3 20R 6616 3000 3050 5858 
F5.7 CR 450 20 ± 2 0 6312 3000 3050 5450 
F5.8 CR 250 20 ± 2 30R 5465 2500 2550 5110 
F5.9 CR 250 20 ± 4 80R 5912 2500 2550 5577 
F5.10 CR 350 10 ± 3 60L 4441 1600 1650 3989 
F5.11 CR 450 10 ± 3 80R 4501 1600 1650 4110 
F5.12 CR 450 5 ± 2 0 4191 1600 1650 3147 
F5.13 CR 450 5 ± 2 30R 4163 1600 1650 3182 
F5.14 CR 250 5 ± 2 0 4086 1600 1650 2982 
F5.P33 PA 1502 15 ± 2 0 4498 1600 1650 4029 
F5.153 PA 210 5 ± 2 30R 4101 1600 1650 3024 
F5.163 PA 1502 15 ± 2 0 4498 1600 1650 4029 
 
Notes: 1. Calculated for a 53,500 lb aircraft and the lesser of 5 G or 80% of available G             
  recovery. 
2. Airspeed not less than on-speed AOA. 
























































































































F6.P1 CR 250 5 ± 2 0 7588 5100 5150 2992 
F6.P2 CR 550 25 ± 2 0 9198 5100 5150 6357 
F6.1 CR 550 40 ± 4 40L 11521 5100 5150 10022 
F6.2 CR 450 30 ± 5 120L 9279 4000 4050 7992 
F6.3 CR 450 35 ± 3 30L 8679 4000 4050 7293 
F6.4 CR 550 25 ± 2 0 8098 4000 4050 6357 
F6.5 CR 250 30 ± 5 120L 7088 3000 3050 6342 
F6.6 CR 350 30 ± 3 20R 6669 3000 3050 5929 
F6.7 CR 450 20 ± 2 0 6347 3000 3050 5497 
F6.8 CR 250 20 ± 2 30R 6012 3000 3050 5157 
F6.9 CR 250 20 ± 4 80R 6480 3000 3050 5650 
F6.10 CR 350 10 ± 3 60L 4447 1600 1650 4001 
F6.11 CR 450 10 ± 3 80R 4505 1600 1650 4118 
F6.12 CR 450 5 ± 2 0 4194 1600 1650 3155 
F6.13 CR 450 5 ± 2 30R 4165 1600 1650 3187 
F6.14 CR 250 5 ± 2 0 4088 1600 1650 2992 
F6.P23 PA 1502 15 ± 2 0 4498 1600 1650 4095 
F6.153 PA 210 5 ± 2 30R 4110 1600 1650 3031 
F6.163 PA 1502 15 ± 2 0 4498 1600 1650 4095 
 
Notes: 1.     Calculated for a 61,000 lb aircraft and the lesser of 5 G or 80% of available G 
recovery. 
2. Airspeed not less than on-speed AOA. 









































































































































F4.P1 CR 250 20 ± 2 0 11040 5100 5150 7968 
F4.P2 CR 550 40 ± 4 0 14023 5100 5150 12392 
F4.1 CR 550 40 ± 4 0 14023 5100 5150 12392 
F4.2 CR 450 35 ± 3 0 10987 3500 3550 9836 
F4.3 CR 450 20 ± 2 30L 9938 3500 3550 8767 
F4.4 CR 450 30 ± 4 80R 11290 3500 3550 10325 
F4.5 CR 550 20 ± 3 50L 10560 3500 3550 9463 
F4.6 CR 350 30 ± 4 60R 10350 3500 3550 9205 
F4.7 CR 250 20 ± 2 0 9440 3500 3550 7968 
F4.8 CR 450 10 ± 4 120L 7910 1600 1650 7643 
F4.9 CR 250 10 ± 4 120R 7648 1600 1650 7182 
F4.10 CR 350 10 ± 2 20L 7335 1600 1650 6787 
F4.11 CR 550 10 ± 2 0 7507 1600 1650 7005 
F4.12 CR 550 10 ± 2 40L 7695 1600 1650 7263 
F4.13 CR 250 10 ± 4 80R 7612 1600 1650 7149 
F4.14 CR 250 5 ± 2 30R 7149 1600 1650 6085 
F4.P33 PA 1502 15 ± 2 30R 7515 1600 1650 7172 
F4.153 PA 190 5 ± 2 0 7145 1600 1650 6039 
F4.163 PA 1502 15 ± 2 30R 7515 1600 1650 7172 
 
Note: 1. Calculated for a 53,500 lb aircraft and the lesser of 5 G or 80% of available G 
recovery. 
 2. Airspeed not less than on-speed AOA. 
 3. 2G and maximum landing weight (50,600 lb) 
      4. All altitudes based on highest local terrain elevation of 5348 feet MSL. 
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Nuisance Warning testing  
     The final phase of testing was nuisance warning evaluation.  The system design made trade-
offs in performance to reduce nuisance warnings as much as possible because of prior experience 
with GPWS, which initially was prone to nuisance warnings.  To verify this, a series of tests were 
flown to probe the edges of the aircraft operating envelope.  No buffer altitudes or other 
limitations were imposed on the aircraft for these flights. 
Low-Level Performance 
      Two nuisance warning low-level routes were developed and flown to ensure that tactically 
representative maneuvers made during low-level flight would not result in warnings.  These 
routes included mountainous terrain, ridgeline crossings, canyons and flight over water.  They 
were flown with both the FE/CL and INT loads, first at 500 ft and then at 200 ft.  Safety 
mitigations included buildup, and a chase aircraft for the 200 ft evaluation.  The routes were 
flown at 450 – 540 KCAS.  Figure 6-12 details one of the two routes within the R2508 restricted 
area. 
Low Altitude Tactics 
     Another potential source of nuisance warnings was the standard maneuvers and dive angle 
rules that make up Low Altitude Tactics (LAT).  These are Three Dimensional (3D) evasive 
maneuvers that are flown to within 200 ft of the ground in strict accordance with a set of rules 
that detail dive angle and altitude.  The test team used the safety displays detailed earlier and a 
safety observer in the control room to provide a knock-it-off call if required.  These standard 
maneuvers were flown with a LAT qualified Test Pilot and LAT instructor Safety Pilot in the 
back seat.  All points were flown first in the simulator, and several proficiency flights were flown 





























































































































S14.P1.1 CR 550 40 ± 4 40L 9764 6200 6250 7300 
S14.1.1 CR 550 40 ± 4 40L 8764 5200 5250 7300 
S14.1.2 CR 450 30 ± 5 120L 6196 3600 3650 5200 
S14.1.3 CR 250 30 ± 5 120L 4679 2900 2950 4000 
S14.1.4 CR 450 20 ± 2 0 3819 2900 2950 3100 
S14.1.5 CR 250 20 ± 2 30R 3620 2900 2950 2900 
S14.1.6 CR 350 10 ± 3 60L 1979 1400 1450 1700 
S14.P1.7 PA 210 5 ± 2 30R 1631 1400 1450 800 
S14.1.7 PA 210 5 ± 2 30R 931 700 750 800 
 
Notes: 1. Calculated for a 61,000 lb aircraft and the lesser of 5 G or 80% of available G recovery. 






TAWS Low-Level Nuisance Route 
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     The 3D LAT maneuvers consisted of the Straight-ahead Oblique Jink (SOJ), Vertical Jink, 
Reverse Oblique Jink (ROJ), and Turning Oblique Jink (TOJ), as listed in Table 6-12, which 
details the test points and bottom-out altitudes. 
Weapons Delivery Recovery Testing 
     Some weapons delivery profiles at the edges of the aircraft performance envelope were also 
flown to check for possible nuisance warnings.  While no weapons were released, these were 
performed with the heavy INT loadout and were conducted on the range with the test team safety 
observers and displays.  All points were flown in the simulator first, and buildup was applied by 
flying the fastest point at each dive angle at stepped up altitudes prior to lowering the profile to 
the minimum altitude.  The altitude lost during these “warmup” delivery profiles was compared 
with the predictions before moving down.  The “Z-Diagrams” detailing the dive delivery 
parameters are presented as Figure 6-13.  Recovery was initiated at the release altitude or the 
aircraft “Break-X” (a HUD bombing mode symbol which indicates the weapon has insufficient 
 
Table 6-11 
LAT  Dive Rule Recovery Test Points 
 
Dive Recovery Run KCAS 
Dive  AOB Altitude  
Bottom-out 
Altitude  
F12.2.1 420 10 0 500 200 
F12.2.2 480 10 0 500 200 
F12.2.3 520 10 0 500 200 
F12.2.4 420 25 0 1500 200 
F12.2.5 480 25 0 1500 200 
F12.2.6 520 25 0 1500 200 
F12.2.7 420 20 0 1000 200 
F12.2.8 480 20 0 1000 200 
F12.2.9 520 20 0 1000 200 
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Table 6-12 
3D LAT maneuvers 
 
Dive Recovery 





F12.3.1 SOJ 20 0 200 
F12.3.2 Vert Jink 20 0 200 
F12.3.3 ROJ 20 0 200 
F12.3.4 TOJ 20 0 200 
F12.3.5 SOJ 25 0 200 
F12.3.6 Vert Jink 25 0 200 
F12.3.7 ROJ 25 0 200 
F12.3.8 TOJ 25 0 200 
 
time to properly arm) whichever comes first.  No buffer altitudes were used. 
Off-Nominal Approaches 
     The final nuisance warning check was during simulated off-nominal carrier landing 
approaches.  While a primary designed use for the system includes providing protection around 
the carrier landing pattern, there was some concern that warnings might be given in off-nominal, 
but not CFIT imminent conditions.  Therefore several series of approaches was designed which 
included final corrections near the touchdown point to see whether warnings would be triggered.     
These tests were run under the control of a Landing Signal Officer (LSO) just as they would be 
during a carrier landing, but were performed at China Lake rather than at an actual aircraft carrier.  
The LSO acted as the safety observer, ready to call a wave-off if adverse trends were noted 










Weapons Delivery Nuisance Warning Test Dive Profiles 
 
F12.1.3 
8000 ft, 400 KCAS 
Bottom Out 500 ft 
530 KCAS  
2200 ft  Break X  
30° 
Initiate Recovery  2174 ft  
500 –  540 kts  
27°  
31°
Practice 1  
9000 ft, 450 KCAS  
Bottom Out 1500 ft  
580 KCAS  
0.95M  
600 KTAS  
2600 ft  Break X  
30°  
Initiate Recovery  3432 ft  




8000 ft, 450 KCAS  
Bottom Out 500 ft  
580 KCAS  
0.95M  
600 KTAS  
2600 ft  Break X  
30° 
Initiate Recovery 2432 ft  
550 –  590 kts
 F12.1.2 
8000 ft, 350 KCAS  
Bottom Out 500 ft  
470 KCAS  
480 KTAS  
1840 ft  Break X  
30° 
Initiate Recovery  1908 ft  






Off-Nominal Approach and Landing Scenarios 
Approach # Pass 
F13.2.1 VFR approach,400 KCAS 1000 foot break at numbers, tight pattern, flared, Touch-and-Go 
F13.2.2 
VFR approach, simulate IFR approach, break out at 
200 feet, high on centerline over end of runway, flare, 
Touch-and-Go, repeat as required. 
F13.2.3 VFR approach, 400 KCAS 1500 foot break at numbers, tight pattern, flare, Touch-and-Go. 
F13.2.4 
VFR approach, simulate IFR approach, break out at 
200 feet, high over end of runway and 200 feet right 
of centerline, descend to runway and flare, Touch-and-








Off –Nominal Carrier Landing Scenarios 
Approach # Pass LSO notes 
 Nominal pass. OK 
F13.1.1 1 ball high start, correct to on glideslope by in the middle position HX HCDIM 
F13.1.2 2 ball high start, correct to on glideslope by in the middle position HX HCDIM 
F13.1.3 1  ball high from start to in the middle, correct to on glideslope by in close position  HX-IM HCDIC 
F13.1.4 
High overshooting start,  2 ball high overshooting 
start, correcting to on glideslope and on line up by in 





7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
     Flight testing terrain warning systems intended for use on high performance aircraft presents 
many unique challenges due to the required operating envelope and basic assumptions made in 
their design.  There is usually very little margin allowed for recovery once a warning is issued, 
and testing such systems thoroughly and safely can be extraordinarily difficult. 
As discussed in the previous section, some particular techniques can be employed to both safely 
and thoroughly test such systems. 
     First, some means of elevating the testing away from the true terrain must be used if the 
system is designed to provide last second warnings that would be too hazardous to test without 
sensible terrain clearance factors.  The use of a designed-in capability for “tricking” the system 
into adding a safety buffer to calculated results while still using aircraft sensor inputs should be 
considered. 
     The use of simulation to extend test results can provide a means of affordably testing a system 
safely throughout an aircraft’s operating envelope.  Though the cost of developing and validating 
the models using carefully constructed flight tests can be expensive, it is cost effective when 
considering the cost of repeated flights in a fly-fix-fly scenario which is often required to 
optimize protection algorithms and minimize nuisance warnings.  In addition, simulation 
scenarios that are unsafe to fly can be run to test system operation to the extreme edges of the 
aircraft operating envelope.  It is recommended that simulation models be developed and 
validated for use in testing terrain avoidance systems. 
     Since terrain warning systems rely on aircraft sensors to provide inputs, considerable risk is 
generated by using those sensor to provide safety information during flight test.  A single sensor 
malfunction could result in failure to initiate a timely recovery. In addition, test pilot task 
saturation or fixation can also result in failure to recover from test maneuvers near terrain.  These 
risks can be mitigated by instrumenting test aircraft with redundant sensors, as well as telemetry 
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systems to relay appropriate data to dedicated safety monitors that can focus solely on issuing 
backup recovery initiation calls if required. 
     In addition, thorough testing of terrain avoidance systems intended for high-performance 
aircraft would require an inordinate number of flights to cover all of the possible permutations of 
aircraft configuration, external stores asymmetry and maneuver envelopes possible for modern 
multi-mission aircraft.  A worst-case set of configurations should be defined to maintain 
confidence that the system will work as expected throughout its intended operating envelope. 
     Also, the nature of terrain avoidance system testing, where most events need to occur in 
proximity to terrain, introduces some unusual risks into a planned test program.  Close attention 
to detail and a very rigorous safety review process must be utilized to ensure that nothing is 
overlooked, and that the planned events are safe. 
     Table 7-1 summarizes the recommendations for conducting safe and effective flight tests of 







Summary of Recommendations 
 Recommendation 
1 Design a system safety buffer to move testing away from terrain 
2 
Simulation models must be validated and used to verify proper warning generation at 
the edges of the protection envelope and to optimize CFIT protection versus nuisance 
warnings. 
3 Instrument the test aircraft with telemetry for use in providing dedicated safety 
displays on the ground for backup recovery calls. 
4 
Worst case gross weight, asymmetry and operational scenarios should be developed to 
spot check system operation throughout the aircraft operating envelope for all mission 
areas. 
5 A rigorous safety review process should be utilized to ensure safety when developing 
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0 Aircraft_Type Determines which aircraft TAWS is in 2 1 
1 Bank_Threshold Threshold for when "close enough" to 
Ending_Roll 
30 30 
2 Cruise_Clearance_Altitude Targeted bottom-out altitude 50 50 
3 Data_Invalid_Threshold Maximum number of invalid DTED points 5 5 
4 Default_Weight Fail safe gross weight value - used when 
weight is available 
30000 40000 
5 Gear_Structural_Limit Landing gear sink rate structural limit 24.8 26.4 
6 Landing_Altitude_Threshold Maximum altitude for landing profile 500 500 
7 Landing_Clearance_Altitude Targeted altitude for structural gear limit 10 10 
8 Maximum_G Maximum value for target normal 
acceleration 
5 5 
9 PA_Lift_Coefficient Lift coefficient for landing profile 1.5 1.55 
10 Pilot_Delay_Time Basic pilot reaction time 1 1 
11 Reference_Weight Reference weight for G-limiter 32357 42097 
12 Roll_Mode_Constant  Roll mode time constant 0.5 0.5 
13 UA_Lift_Coefficient Lift coefficient for cruise profile 1.7078 1.8 
14 Wing_Area Wing area for lift computation 400 500 
15 Dyn_Press_Threshold Threshold for switching between PA & UA 202 195 
16 Landing_Airspeed_Threshold Maximum airspeed for landing profile 200 200 
17 Close_to_ground Minimum value for believable DTED_HAT 10 10 
18 DTED_Bad_K Value for DTED_Error when DTED is invalid 299 299 
19 DTED_Bad_value Value for terrain height when DTED is 
invalid 
-32767 -32767 
20 First_DTED_Error Initial value for DTED Error 10 10 
21 First_Sigma_P Initial value for Sigma P 5 5 
22 First_terrain_variation Initial value for terrain variations 5 5 
23 I_am_lost Maximum value to believe current aircraft 
position 
500 500 
24 I_am_REALLY_lost Maximum value to believe aircraft position 
when over the ocean 
5000 5000 
25 Lowest_Max_DTED_Error Minimum value for Max_DTED_Error 120 120 
26 Max_under_ground Value used when checking if the aircraft is 
below the DTED terrain 
50 50 
27 MSL_Error_Divisor MSL Error divisor for calculating DTED 
error 
20 20 
28 Sigma_Mult_for_Max_Error How many standard deviations is Maximum error? 4 4 
29 Terrain_Exponent Exponent for terrain height used to 
determine DTED error 
0.25 0.25 
30 Terrain_Multiplier Factor for multiplying terrain variation to 
determine DTED error 
2 2 
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determine DTED error 
31 Terrain_Quality_Index Conversion of terrian variation to equivalent 
of sigma_P 
0.25 0.25 
32 Terrain_Variation_K Decay divisor for calculating terrain variation 15000 15000 
33 Max_Error_K Value for Maximum DTED Error when 
DTED is invalid 
99999 99999 
34 Accuracy_Exponent Weighting for 1 frame of Rad_Alt data 3 3 
35 Diff_BW_Neighbor_divisor Proportion of Diff_BW_Neighbor to add to 
Final_HAT 
2 2 
36 Long_Bias_decay Constant to determine speed of decay for 
Long_Bias 
0.998 0.998 
37 Long_Bias_divisor Constant to determine how much 1 frame 
contributes to the Long_Bias 
200000 200000 
38 Nuisance_K Weighting of buffer "noise" to add to 
Final_HAT 
1.0 1.0 
39 Rad_Error_K Constant to determine part of Rad_Alt_Error used for noise buffer 0.5 0.5 
40 Short_Bias_decay Constant to determine speed of decay for 
Short_Bias 
0.90 0.90 
41 Short_Bias_divisor Constant to determine how much 1 frame 
contributes to the Short_Bias 
5000 5000 
42 S_b_divisor Proportion of Short_Bias used to derive 
noise in Final_HAT 
4 4 
43 Inhibit_Timer_Threshold Threshold value for inhibit timer to indicate timeout 11 11 
44 Baro_Bias F/A-18 bias put into INS Baro in some 
transonic conditions 
800 800 
45 Baro_Error_Multiplier Estimated error in BARO altitude based on 
spec 
0.042 0.042 
46 First_MSL_Error_Est Initial value for MSL Altitude error 50 50 
47 GPS_Alt_Error_Max Altitude error limit for using GPS data 80 80 
48 GPS_Pos_Error_Max Position error limit for using GPS data 80 80 
49 Lower_transonic Beginning of transonic mach region 0.95 0.95 
50 Position_Drift_Timer Time of how long after loss of GPS we lose position fix 500 500 
51 Upper_transonic End of transonic mach region 1.05 1.05 
52 Aural_Persistence_Timer_Threshold Threshold value for aural persistence timer 
to indicate timeout 
4 4 
53 Gear_Repetition_Time Repetition t ime for "Check Gear" when gear handle is down 80 80 
54 Latch_Timer_Bank_Threshold Bank threshold value for latch timer 45 45 
55 Latch_Timer_Threshold Threshold value for latch timer to indicate 
timeout 
20 20 
56 Left_Bank_Threshold Threshold to determine left/right roll 
command 
150 150 
57 PA_Power_Threshold Criteria for using "Power" during landings 8.5 8.5 
58 Throttle_Threshold Threshold to determine when at full power 100 46.5 
59 UA_Power_Threshold Criteria for using "Power" during cruise 18 18 
60 Enough_bad_hits Number of bad data points needed to disable Over_Ocean 500 500 
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61 Exponent_for_Rad_Alt_angle Increase in error due to platform not level 3 3 
62 Need_consecutive_hits How many good consecutive rad alt 
readings needed for persistency timer 
3 3 
63 Ocean_Check_MSL_Multiplier Multiplier for potential error when verifying no terrain over the ocean 2 2 
64 Proportion_of_sigma_P Additional error from terrain roughness 
ahead 
50 50 
65 Rad_Alt_multiplier Proportional radar altimeter error 0.005 0.005 
66 Starting_Rad_Alt_K Constant radar altimeter error 2 2 
67 Minimum_good_Rad_Alt_HAT Minimum value to believe Rad_Alt with 
DTED 
40 40 
68 First_Pos_Error Initial value for Position_Error 100 100 
69 Points_to_Use How far ahead to look in DTED to calculate 
Sigma_P 
15 15 
70 Under_the_Earth Lower-than-possible value for DTED terrain height -1000 -1000 
71 Coast_Altitude_Threshold Altitude below which COAST should 
transition to OPERATE 
4000 4000 
72 Envelope_Timer_Threshold Threshold value for envelope timer to 
ignore the radar altimeter 
40 40 
73 Ignore_Radalt_Altitude_Threshold Altitude above which the Radar Altimeter 
may be ignored if not locked on the ground 
5000 5000 
74 Level_Terrain_Time_Threshold Time threshold of level terrain 40 40 
75 Maximum_Coast_Timer Timeout value for the Coast timer 1200 1200 
76 Maximum_Envelope_Timer Maximum value for the envelope timer for 
ignoring the radar altimeter 
110 110 
77 Maximum_Ignore_Timer Maximum value for the ignore timer for radar altitude 100 100 




Radar altitude which is always ignored 
when above the 
Ignore_Radalt_Altitude_Threshold 
10 10 
80 Over_Ocean_Elevation_Threshold Terrain elevation threshold for non-DTED 
over ocean determination 
100 100 
81 Over_Ocean_Slope_Threshold Terrain slope threshold for non-DTED over 
ocean determination 
1 1 
82 Slope_Airspeed_Threshold Airspeed above which terrain slope can be 
computed 
170 170 
83 Terrain_Elevation_Timer_Threshold Time threshold for erroneous COAST 
terrain elevations 
41 41 
84 Gear_Altitude_Threshold Altitude below which gear protection is 
provided 
150 150 
85 Takeoff_Timer_Threshold Threshold value for takeoff timer to indicate timeout 600 600 
86 Waveoff_Airspeed_Threshold Airspeed below which wave-off can be 
sensed 
200 200 
87 Waveoff_Altitude_Threshold Altitude below which wave-off can be 
sensed 
500 500 
88 Waveoff_Sink_Rate_Threshold Sink rate required for wave-off -16.67 -16.67 
89 Waveoff_Timer_Threshold Threshold value for wave-off timer to indicate timeout 50 50 
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90 Weight_Off_Wheels_Timer_Threshold Threshold value for weight-off-wheels time 
to indicate timeout 
60 60 
91 Terrain Slope Level Threshold Threshold which defines level terrain slope 
for COAST transition 
2 2 
92 Maximum_Gonset Maximum Gonset rate during normal operations 5 5 
93 Minimum_Gonset Minimum Gonset rate 0.15 0.15 
94 Maximum_Gonset_Nuisance Maximum Gonset Rate in nuisance prone 
areas 
6 6 
95 Radar_Altitude_Jump_In_Threshold Radar altitude which, when below, is 
ignored 
500 500 
96 Maximum_Radalt_Con_Timer Maximum value for the Radalt Consistency timer  10 10 
97 Radalt_Consistency_Threshold Time threshold for consistent radalt data 6 6 
98 Maximum_Terrain_Timer Maximum value for the Calc_terrain_timer 10 10 
99 Maximum_Roll_Time Maximum value for Roll_Time 4 4 
100 Long_Bias_Multiplier_for_DTED Long bias effect on DTED_Error 2 2 
101 Min_Baro_Error Minimum value for barometric altitude error 75 75 
102 ORT_Bank_Angle_Max Threshold for bank angle to allow upward lift for ORT 72 72 
103 ORT_Bank_Cos_Max Threshold for cos(bank angle) to allow 
upward lift for ORT  
0.3 0.3 
104 Avail_Thrust_Con Constant value for available thrust 
determination 
19177.7 32012.41 
105 Avail_Thrust_M1 Coefficient for first order mach term in 
thrust determination 
14745.2 -26821.5 
106 Avail_Thrust_M2 Coefficient for second order mach term in thrust determination 0 62407.06 
107 Avail_Thrust_M3 Coefficient for third order mach term in 
thrust determination 
0 -27683.1 
108 Avail_Thrust_A1 Coefficient for first order angle of attack 
term in thrust determination 
0 2.346588 
109 Drag_Coeff_Con Constant value for drag determination 0.0052623 0.0040243 
110 Drag_Coeff_M1 Coefficient for first order mach term in drag 
determination 
-0.097529 -0.292672 
111 Drag_Coeff_M2 Coefficient for second order mach term in 
drag determination 
0.0721954 0.5913677 
112 Drag_Coeff_M3 Coefficient for third order mach term in 
drag determination 
0 -0.240227 
113 Drag_Coeff_A1 Coefficient for first order angle of attack term in drag determination 0.0043428 -0.007449 
114 Drag_Coeff_A2 Coefficient for second order angle of attack 
term in drag determination 
-0.001068 0.0025667 
115 Drag_Coeff_A3 Coefficient for third order angle of attack 
term in drag determination 
0 0.000035 
116 Drag_Coeff_MA1 Coefficient for first order mach times angle 
of attack term in drag determination 
-0.013219 0.0017992 
117 MinG Minimum G for target normal acceleration 1.2 1.2 
118 Roughness_Factor 
Weighting of terrain roughness in 
determination of MSL altitude for 
trajectories 
-0.4 -0.4 
119 Width_of_T_divisor Divisor for determining "T" intersection of 
VRT 
8 8 
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120 High_Altitude_G_Bucket_Delta Reduction in G-limiter value due to 
transonic flight at high altitudes 
1.0 1.0 
121 Low_Altitude_G_Bucket_Delta Reduction in G-limiter value due to transonic flight at low altitudes 1.0 1.7 
122 G_Bucket_Altitude_Threshold Altitude at which the high/low altitude G-
bucket delta changes 
0 15000 
123 G_Bucket_Minimum_Mach_NoStores 
Minimum mach number at which the G-
bucket can be engaged with STORES flag 
not set 
0.95 0.941 
124 G_Bucket_Minimum_Mach__Stores Minimum mach number at which the G-
bucket can be engaged with STORES set 
0.91 0.905 
125 G_Bucket_Maximum_Mach Maximum mach number at which the G-
bucket can be engaged 
1.04 1.045 
126 Corner_Speed Minimum airspeed required to produce the 
maximum G 
xxx1 xxx1 
127 Maximum_Bank_Angle Maximum bank angle for which this 
reduction in pilot response time applies 
30 30 
128 Minimum_Airspeed Minimum airspeed for which this reduction 
in pilot response time applies 
400 400 
129 Maximum_Airspeed Maximum airspeed for which this reduction in pilot response time applies 525 525 
130 Reduced_Pilot_Delay Reduced pilot response time for nuisance 
prevention 
1.3 1.3 
131 Minimum_Dive_Angle Minimum dive angle for which this 
reduction in pilot response time applies 
5 5 
132 Maximum_Dive_Angle Maximum dive angle for which this 
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BYPASS N/A INS 
Aided INS, 










1 The first priority used for position is the Aided INS mode, where GPS position is used to update the INS regularly.  
Falling back to solely GPS-only degrades performance slightly, and has no effect on System Mode.  The same logic 
prevails for velocities. 
 
2 The MSL altitude is set with the following priority (highest to lowest):  GPS; INS BARO; ADC BARO.  Differences 
in MSL altitude source have no effect on System Mode. 
 
3 The TAWS can go to the COAST mode only when the terrain has been determined to be level and the TAWS is in the 






F/A-18 TAWS Developmental Test Plan Test Hazard Analysis 
HAZARDOUS  
CONDITION 
CAUSE EFFECT RISK ASSESSMENT PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE HAZARD 
LEVEL 
Controlled Flight Into 
Terrain (CFIT) during 
Nuisance Cue Testing 
Loss of situational 
awareness in close 
proximity to terrain. 
Loss of 
aircraft/aircrew. 
Low risk given proper aircrew 
experience/practice, test 
briefing, and execution. 
− Required weather: day VMC with defined horizon and 
visual contact with terrain. 
− All maneuvers are operationally representative; no 
special maneuvers are required nor desired.  Pilot’s 
focus will be on flying the maneuver; any nuisance 
warnings will be automatically recorded on 
instrumentation.  Any pilot comments or observations 
will be recorded verbally following aircraft recovery 
and between maneuvers. 
− Provide sufficient proficiency through simulators 
and/or warm-up flights. 
Low Level Navigation 
− Chase aircraft required on 200 ft low levels (Chase 
min altitude 500 ft).  
− Pilot must fly 500 ft low level build up prior to 200 ft  
− Both 500 ft and 200 ft low level will be flown over the 
same route. 
− Back seat safety aircrew required. 
Weapons 
− Standard weapons dive delivery profiles in accordance 
with the TACMAN, reference 7. 
− Practice weapons dive delivery profiles will be flown 
initially 1000 ft above the lowest test point altitude. 
− Recoveries at the stepped up altitude will be 
monitored to verify the actual altitude lost during 
recovery does not exceed predicted altitude loss. 
− Flight parameters are monitored real-time by a safety 
monitor and call for recovery if safety parameters are 
exceeded. 
− Radar altimeter set at minimum release/initiate 
recovery altitudes.  Warning bug checked prior to 
maneuvers. 
− G warm-up maneuvers.  












CAUSE EFFECT RISK ASSESSMENT PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE HAZARD 
LEVEL 
Controlled Flight Into 
Terrain during LAT 
flights 
Reduced roll 




Low risk given proper aircrew 
experience/practice, test 
briefing, and execution. 
LAT 
− Thorough LAT brief conducted prior to flight. 
− LAT dive rules reviewed prior to each maneuver. 
− Back seat LAT instructor safety pilot required. 
− Prerequisite 500 ft low level. 
− Ground monitoring of critical flight parameters.  
− LAT flown to comfort level, but no lower than 200 ft. 
− LAT pre-flown in simulator at flight test conditions 
and weights. 
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CAUSE EFFECT RISK ASSESSMENT PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE HAZARD 
LEVEL 
Controlled Flight Into 
Terrain (CFIT) during 
CFIT Protection 
(Simulated loss of 
SA)/ Functional 
Testing. 
Loss of situational 
awareness, misapplied 
recovery controls, 




Low risk given proper aircrew 
experience/practice, test 
briefing, and execution. 
− Functional tests will be completed prior to simulated 
loss of SA tests. 
− G warm up, recoveries targeting g onset rat es, 
sustained g and roll rates required for TAWS 
recoveries will be practiced through warm up events.  
− Use of safety buffers to raise TAWS warning 
altitudes. 
− Recoveries will be practiced at the fastest and slowest 
test speeds in configuration CR prior to CR tests and 
at the slowest test speed in configuration PA prior to 
PA tests.  
− Provide sufficient proficiency through simulator 
sessions. 
− Back seat safety pilot required for CFIT protection 
testing. 
− Radar altimeter hard-bug and BARO soft -bug set at 
terminate run altitude and warning bugs checked prior 
to maneuvers. 
− Flight parameters are monitored real-time by a safety 
monitor and call for recovery if safety parameters are 
exceeded. 
− Weather day VMC with defined horizon and visual 
contact with terrain. 
− Brief knock-it-off parameters prior to maneuver entry. 
− Reviewed GPWS AV-8B mishap report OPNAV 










G Induced Loss of 
Consciousness 
(GLOC) during CFIT 
Protection (Simulated 
loss of SA/ Functional 
Testing).  
High G-onset rates 





to loss of 
aircraft/aircrew. 
Low risk given extensive 
aircrew experience and warm-
up. 
A G warm-up will be performed prior to t esting (IAW 
NSATS/NWTC SOP, reference 8). 
Aircraft recoveries will be practiced in the simulator prior to test 
flights and during practice maneuver prior to test events.  
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CAUSE EFFECT RISK ASSESSMENT PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE HAZARD 
LEVEL 
Aircraft overstress. Overly aggressive dive 
recovery. 
 
Excessive rate of 




Low risk given proper aircrew 
experience/practice, test 
briefing, and execution. 
G warm up, recoveries targeting G-onset rates, sustained G, and 
roll rates required for TAWS recoveries will be practiced through 
warm up events. 
Ground monitoring of critical flight parameters.  
LSO monitor landing parameters during off nominal approaches.  
Brief maximum landing weights. 
RTB if overstress occurs and analyze to determine cause before 
proceeding with test. 
III/D 
CAT A 
Bird-strike. Operating at altitudes 
where birds normally 
fly. 
Possible damage 
to or loss of 
aircraft.  Possible 
injury to or loss 
of aircrew. 
Potential risk based on frequent 
low level operations during 
T&E. 
Visual look-out by aircrew will be maintained at all times. 
If bird-strike should occur, aircraft will climb above 10KFT 
MSL, conduct a controllability check, and return to base or a 
suitable divert. 
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